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Abstract
In this paper we analyse the extent to which party programmes reﬂect the populist type of 
democracy-critique and propose a classiﬁcation of different types of populism. We deﬁne 
populism as a political ideology critical of representative democracy but not necessarily anti-
democratic, claiming that populism is more than mere political tactics or style of political 
communication. Populism is operationalised into three core dimensions: populists combine 
an appeal to ʻthe people  ʼ with anti-establishment critique and a call for a more direct link 
between political leaders and citizens. We analyse party programmes of six parties that are often 
labelled populist: the Schweizerische Volkspartei (Switzerland), the Front National (France), 
Lijst Pim Fortuyn (the Netherlands), Vlaams Blok (Belgium), Die Republikaner (Germany) and 
the Freiheitliche Partei Österreich (Austria). Our analysis shows that substantial programmatic 
differences exist between these parties and we therefore distinguish between several varieties 
of populism, depending on the way ʻthe people  ʼare deﬁned, the character of anti-establishment 
statements and the type of proposals for creating a direct link between citizens and government. 
Hence we reject the undifferentiated and dichotomous use of the concept populism and suggest 
four dimensions along which populist parties can be classiﬁed.
This paper was written as part of the research programme ʻSociale Cohesieʼ, funded by the 
NWO (Netherlands Organisation for Scientiﬁc Research). Earlier versions of this paper were 
presented at the Dutch-Flemish Politicolgenetmaal, 27-28 May 2004, Antwerp, Belgium and 
at the ECPR Second Pan-European Conference on EU Politics, 24-26 June 2004, Bologna, 
Italy. We would like to thank Karen Bottom, Catherine Netjes, Andreas Noelke, Peter Ucen and 
Angela Wigger for their useful comments.  
11 Introduction
With the increasing political turmoil in European party systems over the last two decades, populism 
has become an often-used concept in political science. Focusing on new challenger-parties 
such as the Dutch Lijst Pim Fortuyn, the Flemish Vlaams Blok and the French Front National 
scholars try to explain the success and nature of these parties and the like by using the concept 
of populism (Arditi 2003; Arzheimer 2003; Betz 2002; Betz and Immerfall 1998; Hayward 
1996; Ivarsﬂaten 2002, 2003; Jagers and Walgrave 2003; Kitschelt 1995, 2002; Taggart 2002). 
However, the label ʻpopulist parties  ʼis used indiscriminately, often in a dichotomous manner 
(parties are populist or not) and without too much consideration for inter-party differences. 
While this lack of conceptual precision is not uncommon among political scientists, we argue 
that the term populism needs to be deﬁned and operationalised more precisely and in a relative 
manner, providing the opportunity of variation among political parties across time and space.  
 In political science literature there is much confusion and ambiguity about the nature 
and character of populism. Populism is sometimes considered to be only a tactical device, a 
mere form of rhetoric or style of communication (Jagers and Walgrave 2003). We argue that it 
is more fruitful to perceive of populism as an ideology, which incorporates a speciﬁc form of 
democracy-critique. Thus, we conceptualise and operationalise populism to its core element: the 
sovereignty of the people. In this we follow Margaret Canovan who understands populism ʻas 
an appeal to “the people” against both the established structure of power and the dominant ideas 
and values of the society  ʼ(Canovan 1999: 3). In this appeal to the people we recognise a call 
for the removal of the establishment, a rejection of their values, and a cry for their replacement 
so that the direct link between people and the political leadership can be restored. This populist 
view of the establishment as the political ʻother´ is not merely an opportunistic electoral 
strategy, but part of a wider ideologically founded critique. Contemporary populists perceive a 
profound crisis of representative democracy caused by an elite that is neither representative of, 
nor responsive to the people. Populists campaign for institutional changes that will break down 
or at least weaken the political intermediaries, in particular the traditional parties, which stand 
in the way of the free expression of the will of the sovereign people through their real leader.
 Due to the often imprecise or ambiguous operationalisation of populism, political 
parties are often labelled populist in a haphazard fashion. Most often the ʻusual suspects  ʼare 
the radical right wing parties in Western Europe. While we do not exclude the possibility that 
these parties may have populist characteristics, we develop a systematic and comprehensive 
conceptualisation of populism that allows us to assess to what extent all political parties are 
populist. After a brief overview of the populism-debate in section 2, we develop three core 
dimensions of populism (appeal to the people, anti-establishment attitude and pro-direct 
democracy stance). Subsequently we analyse the party-programs of six of the ʻusual suspects  ʼ
to assess to what extent they can indeed be called populist. 
22 Populism: a contested concept 
In spite of the frequently uttered cri-de-coeur that populism is too vague a term, most studies 
into populism devote little attention to deﬁning populism. Moreover, little scholarly consensus 
seems to exist on the exact deﬁnition of populism and parties are often considered populist 
according to conventional wisdom (see for example Golder 2003). Hence, we agree with 
Canovan (1999: 3) when she states that ʻthere is a good deal of agreement on which political 
phenomena fall into this category but less clarity about what is it that makes them populistʼ. 
So we are left with the unsatisfactory situation that political observers seem to know exactly 
who to call populist but not what precisely constitutes populism. This becomes even more 
problematic when one considers that, unlike ideologies such as liberalism and socialism, hardly 
any contemporary European party likes to refer to itself as populist (an exception being the 
Greek Populist Orthodox Rally). Thus, the fuzziness of the concept, its random use and the 
pejorative meaning of populism obscure the scientiﬁc and public debate. 
2.1 Populism as a political tool or style of political communication
In order to construct an analytical conception of populism with empirical validity, it is 
necessary to distinguish between the various approaches to the concept. A main distinction is 
the understanding of populism as political tactics or strategy vis-à-vis populism as an ideology. 
Several scholars see populism as a tool or a certain style of politics (Canovan 1981; Taggart 2000; 
Jagers and Walgrave 2003). However, approaching populism as mere tactics is problematic. As 
Taggart (2000) himself puts it: “often the populist style is confused with a style that simply 
seeks to be popular”, i.e. an attempt to appeal to a wide range of people. This tactic of appealing 
to a broad electoral clientele is closely associated to the ʻcatch-all peopleʼs partyʼ, which is 
not necessarily populist (Kirchheimer 1966; Krouwel 1999; 2003). Such conceptualisation of 
populism as a strategy has been forwarded by Jagers and Walgrave (2003). In their approach, 
the deﬁning element of populism is an appeal to the people (ʻpopulusʼ), with which populist 
parties identify and legitimise themselves. In an analysis of television-broadcasts by political 
parties, Jagers and Walgrave conclude that substantial differences exist between the political 
communication style of the Vlaams Blok and other parties. They argue that the difference is: 
populism. This ﬁnding corroborates the intuitively plausible idea that there are differences 
in discourse between populist and non-populist parties. However, the problematic aspect of 
approaching populism as a political style tactic remains that it virtually denies populism to have 
any substance.
 A second approach understands populism as ʻsaying what people want to hear  ʼand ʻto 
simplify political mattersʼ. This, however, automatically leads to the conclusion that all political 
parties are populist as it is one of the crucial functions of political parties to offer straightforward 
and clear political alternatives to the electorate. As Mudde (1998) rightfully points out, political 
populism is then basically reduced to nothing more than political campaigning techniques. In 
order to circumvent these problems one needs to differentiate populism from general attempts 
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deﬁnition of populism as ʻan episodic, anti-political, empty-hearted, chameleonic celebration 
of the heartland in the face of crisis  ʼ(2000: 5). Populism in Taggartʼs view has been ʻa tool of 
progressives, of reactionaries, of democrats, of autocrats, of the left and of the right.  ʼ(2000: 
3). While Taggartʼs deﬁnition taps into important elements of populism, in the end he denies 
it to have any substance and again populism is perceived as a tool. Similarly, Shils argued that 
ʻpopulism is characterised by oppositionalism  ʼ(cited in Berlin et al. 1969: 12), while Kitsching 
agrees that ʻpopulism is essentially a reaction to rule  ʼ (cited in Taggart 2000: 14). Deﬁning 
populism only as a political tactic, merely a style of communication or as an anti-political 
and oppositional stance misses the essence of populism. We argue here that populism is an 
ideology with several constituent elements, all derived from its central aim: to inject the will of 
the sovereign people directly into the democratic decision-making process. As Abts (2004: 5) 
puts it, ʻwithout references to an ideological core, populism risks being reduced into a purely 
rhetorical instrument potentially connected to any ideological project  ʼ(our translation). 
2.2 Populist ideology: the nemesis of representative democracy
In a general sense, an ideology can be deﬁned as ʻa more or less coherent set of ideas that 
provides a basis for organised political action [...] intended to preserve, modify or overthrow 
the existing system of power relationships  ʼ(Heywood 2002: 43). It follows from this deﬁnition 
that ideologies present (i) ideas about the present order, (ii) about an ideal-typical situation, and 
(iii) about ways to move from the current to the desired situation. We argue that populism meets 
these criteria of an ideology as it presents thoughts on the present order, proposes an alternative 
as well as a road to reach this perceived ideal world.
 The ﬁrst element of a populist ideology is found in the populists  ʼrejection of the political 
establishment. While critique and rejection of government policies is the raison dʼêtre of every 
oppositional party, populist parties develop a unique set of arguments about the malfunctioning 
of representative democracy and the ruling class. In ʻnormal  ʼdemocratic political competition 
the other parties or politicians are perceived as ʻcontenders  ʼ (alter ego), yet anti-political-
establishment-politics [populists among them] treats the other as an “adversary” (alien)  ʼ
(Schedler 1996: 300). Populism is not anti-democratic. Democracy as an idea is not challenged 
in principle, but in its organisational form. Populist emphasise the tension between democracy 
as an ideal and democracy as a practice. Populists criticise the intermediary organisations 
that stand in the way of the true, direct and uncorrupted expression of the will of the people. 
Populism is not anti-political either; it is highly political, but it dismisses ʻpolitics as usualʼ, the 
political establishment and the ʻpolitical classʼ. Finally, populism should not be perceived as 
ʻanti-system  ʼin the sense of total rejection of the current order: populist parties do not propose 
a coherent and comprehensive alternative to the political-economic organisation of society, as 
the radical left once did. In the populist mind representative democracy needs redemption, not 
replacement.
4 What populists attack is representative democracy as it is organised and the elite that 
perverts it. It is important to note that populists do not entirely reject representative democracy 
(they operate in it); they are not anti-democrats, but democrats who are mugged by reality. Their 
disapproval of representative democracy is a disapproval of elitist democracy and its institutional 
framework. In their view, representatives do not represent the people but only themselves. 
Democracy as it functions is attacked in the name of democracy as an ideal. Populism is then, 
in the words of Kitschelt (2002: 179), ʻan expression of dissatisfaction with existing modes of 
organisation of elite-mass political intermediationʼ. This dissatisfaction is expressed in a typical 
vocabulary and discourse. The populist critique on representative democracy focuses on parties 
as partes pro toto; parties are the heart of representative democracies. An interesting notion in 
this respect is the contribution of Peter Mair (2002), who argues that the real distinction to be 
made is the one between populist democracy and party democracy. Therefore, he says, Tony 
Blair is populist because he bypasses his own party. Politicians such as Blair, the German 
Kanzler Schröder and Dutch Labour leader Wouter Bos try to circumvent the intermediaries in 
their own parties and establish a direct link with party members and the wider electorate. Yet, 
it seems more appropriate to call these politicians political entrepreneurs as they clearly remain 
within established parties and do not reject the main institutional framework of representative 
democracy.
 Next to an anti-political party and anti-establishment stance, populists also formulate 
critique against other political intermediary organisations such as trade unions and interest 
organisations, against the bureaucracy and the press. All these agents obstruct the free expression 
of the will of the people. They simply stand in the way of the direct link between the people and 
their real political leader. For populists, this popular will is the only legitimatisation for political 
action.
 The second criterion for an ideology – a sketch of the ideal type situation – is represented 
within the populist ideology by the idea that governing should be grounded in the ʻvolonté 
généralʼ. Democracy demands that political decisions are made under full popular control, and 
should be a vocation of the will of the people. This brings with it a certain notion of the people, 
perceived as one, united and organic. No cleavages exist but the one between the elite versus the 
mass, between the establishment and the people. Clearly the populist leader sides with the people 
on this divide. In the eyes of the populist, the established elites have hijacked representative 
democracy, and populists will bring it back to the people. As Mudde highlighted, elite and mass 
are moral categories that do not need to exist in reality (2002). This leaves room for different 
connotations of the people, who can be deﬁned ethnically, civically or as the common people 
(ʻthe silent majorityʼ) .
 The people are seen as united and uniform so therefore references to ʻthe people  ʼshould 
not (only) be understood as rhetorical claims, but as part of a consistent ideology. This notion 
of the monolithic people sharpens the distinction between the sovereign people and those ruling 
in their name. Populists construct two cleavages: between the people and the establishment, 
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differences between opposition and government are without meaning. Populists ʻrecode the 
universe of political actors as a homogeneous political class  ʼ(Schedler 1996: 295). For populists, 
the entire political establishment, whether in government or not, is recruited through the same 
corrupt institutional mechanism and they all take part in a corrupt system through which betrays 
the will of the people. 
 The third constituent element of an ideology, how to get from the perverted reality to 
an ideal situation, consists of proposals by populists to break down intermediary structures and 
to construct more direct links between the people and the leader. Populists will propagate more 
direct forms of democracy, in casu referenda, popular consultations and direct election of ofﬁce-
holders. By election of the populist leader (or in the pure populist mind, by his natural selection), 
and through the introduction of mechanisms of direct democracy, the ideal of sovereignty and 
supremacy of the will of the people will be restored. The populist ideology thus has constructive 
elements to it, not only being ʻa vehicle of protest, but at the same time creating an identity […] 
aimed at changing the political regime  ʼ(Abts 2004: 8, our translation).   
3 Operationalisation of populism as an ideology 
From our deﬁnition of populism as an ideology, we can develop quantitative and qualitative 
indicators to examine the extent of populism in party programmes, political broadcast, websites 
or political speeches. According to our operationalisation, party programmes are populist only 
when tapping into all three dimensions: (1) there must be references to ʻthe people  ʼin the sense 
of ʻcommon people  ʼor ʻordinary men  ʼwho the populist claims to represent; (2) programmes 
must include proposals to create a direct relationship between the people and the power holders; 
and (3) they have to contain anti-establishment or anti-elite statements. In this manner we can 
isolate parties that ʻmerely  ʼpropose instruments of direct democracy or those who are ʻsimply  ʼ
opposition parties from populists.
 The ﬁrst stage of our analysis of party programmes is of a quantitative nature. In line 
with the saliency approach (see Robertson 1976), we will simply calculate the percentage of 
sentences referring to ʻthe peopleʼ, as well as the proportion of anti-establishment and anti-elite 
statements and sentences with proposals for more direct forms of democracy. On the basis of 
these data we draw preliminary conclusions on the level of populism. In a subsequent stage 
we will conduct a more in-depth qualitative content analysis of party manifestoes to assess the 
precise nature and intensity of these populist statements, taking into account the context on 
which they bear heavily. 
3.1 References to ʻthe peopleʼ
Our ﬁrst indicator of populism consists of deﬁning ʻthe people  ʼas an organic monolithic entity 
of common men. For populists, the people are ʻone and indivisible  ʼ (Schedler 1996: 294), 
but also ʻordinary  ʼ(Canovan 1999: 5). Central to populism is further the accusation that the 
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of the public good. ʻAlthough reference to the people is common to several political languages, 
not any appeal to them is coupled with the denunciation of the illegitimate power of a small 
clique of elites  ʼ(Papadopoulos 2000: 5). When speaking about the people, we expect populists 
to employ a general terminology, indeed using terms such as ʻthe people  ʼ or ʻthe citizensʼ. 
That is not to say however that references to ʻthe people  ʼcannot be expressed in more speciﬁc 
terms. Populists utilise various deﬁnitions of the people, of who constitutes the people and of 
its qualities; from the entire nation to the underdogs (Canovan 1984, in Abts 2004). In their 
attempt to appeal to a broad public, populists may speak for example of car owners or teachers 
as well. These groups are presented as representative for the people in general, victims of the 
establishment and their self-interested politics. This underlines the populist idea of people as 
ʻordinary men  ʼor ʻ common, tax-paying civiliansʼ, as an illustration of their connection with and 
understanding of the people and their singular will. After all, ʻall virtue resides in the people, 
one and undivided, and all hope resides in its saviour, one and incorruptible (Schedler 1996: 
294). We thus consider statements in party programmes populist if ʻthe people  ʼare understood 
as a monolithic entity without internal cleavages, and if references reﬂect an understanding of 
the people as ʻcommon and ordinaryʼ, in need of protection against the establishment.
3.2 Proposals to create a direct relationship between the people and the power 
holders
As argued above, the core of populist democratic ideology is the supremacy of the will of the 
people as the legitimisation of all decision-making. The road to that ideal-type situation consists 
of creating a direct connection between the people and those in power. Only then, the voice 
of the people can truly be heard (Barney and Laycock 1999). The remedy for the problem of 
democracy that is diagnosed by populists is ʻthe abolishment of any mediation between the 
citizenry and the rulers  ʼ(Papadopoulos 2000: 7). 
 The most evident indicator here lies in concrete proposals for direct democracy such 
as binding referenda, recalls and popular initiatives, popular consultation and direct elections, 
or reforms of the electoral system. For the quantitative part of our analysis we will take into 
account proposals for direct election of heads of state and mayors, binding referenda and 
public consultation. We will simply apply the rule that if these typical instruments of direct 
democracy are proposed or supported in a party programme, the second quintessential element 
of populism is present. In the qualitative part of our analysis we will also take into account other 
institutional proposals and more abstract pledges for change and legitimacy, and promises of 
ʻpolitical reform  ʼthat we assume to be characteristic for the populist rhetoric. As Papadopoulos 
(2000: 7) puts it, ʻpopulists [...] have [...] a ready-made solution to present: more transparency 
to preclude informational asymmetry, or better more cleannessʼ. Here we will also include 
references to the populist party itself, or better ʻmovementʼ, and its leadership. Only they 
possess the virtues that both distinguish them from the establishment and which guarantee the 
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in which the populist movement is portrayed as the sole legitimate alternative to the political 
institutions of the establishment and the only genuine conveyer of the popular will. Here we 
may think of populists referring to their party as the ʻmovement  ʼthat can replace the existing 
political intermediaries for bringing the popular will into politics and an emphasis on the partyʼs 
leadership and cadre as ʻordinary men and women  ʼwho serve as the direct link between the 
preferences of the people and the political arena.
3.3 Anti-establishment statements
Our third indicator of the populist ideology consists of statements directed against an 
establishment of non-representative elites that are recruited through and can survive thanks to 
intermediary institutions and structures. In the populist mind, these intermediary institutions 
harm the sovereignty of the people as they cut the direct line between the people and their true 
advocates, i.e. the populist leader(ship). Against the populist ideal stand formalised structures 
such as political parties and government formation, as well as – and probably even more so 
– informal habits that allegedly represent nepotism and corruption. Populist oratory directed 
against the establishment can take many forms. It may be directed at speciﬁc institutions, 
policies or individual politicians, or formulated in a more general and abstract fashion, 
against a ʻsystem of old partiesʼ, ʻpolitical classʼ, or ʻthe establishmentʼ. It may thereby be 
concentrated not only at political institutions and actors alone since cultural elites, media, trade 
unions, bureaucrats and intellectuals are in the populist imagination suspicious of disturbing 
the direct link between the people and their leader too. They all diffuse the will of the people 
into particular or individual interests. Populists, in the words of Margaret Canovan, ʻdirect their 
challenge to both the political and economic establishments and elite values of the type held by 
opinion-formers in the academia and the media  ʼ(1999: 3). The primary goal of these statements 
is to ʻdelegitimise established structures of interest articulation and aggregation  ʼ(Barney and 
Laycock 1999: 321). 
 This potentially wide range of statements will ﬁrst be approached in a quantitative 
manner. We will count statements directed against a perceivably corrupt and self-interested 
elite of politicians, ʻestablished partiesʼ, ʻpolitics  ʼand media as well as pejorative references 
to institutions, bureaucracy and intermediary organisations in general. We assume that the 
higher the overall number of anti-establishment statements, the more populist the party under 
investigation is. In detailed descriptions of each party we will go into the nature and intensity 
of the anti-establishment statements we found. As we stated before, all three elements of the 
populist ideology need to be discernible in a party programme before we can label a political 
party populist.  
84 Populism in six party programmes
In the following paragraphs we present the results of our analyses into the populist content 
of six European party programmes. Sections 4.2 to 4.4 contain the ﬁndings for each party on 
the three dimensions of our populism model, as well as representative quotes from the party 
manifestoes. In sections 4.5 and 4.6 we draw on our data for a comparison of the parties in 
terms of their relative level of populism, and introduce a preliminary typology of populist 
parties. We analysed recent versions of election programmes of six European political parties: 
the Sweizerische Volkspartei (SVP), French Front National (FN), Lijst Pim Fortuyn (LPF) from 
the Netherlands, the Vlaams Blok (VB), the Freiheitliche Partei Österreich (FPÖ)1 and Die 
Republikaner from Germany. The main reason for our case selection is that all of these parties 
are often labelled populist by political observers. We want to establish whether and to which 
extent this label is justiﬁed. Our relative and continuous conceptualisation of populism allows 
variation among parties concerning their level of populism on each of the three dimensions. 
Before presenting the results of the programme analysis, we will shortly introduce the six 
political parties included in our research. 
4.1 Six European parties ʻsuspected  ʼof populism
The Schweizerische Volkspartei has existed since 1971 when it was formed from a merger of the 
Bernische Bauern-, Gewerbe-, und Bürgerpartei (BGB, founded in 1918) and the Democratic 
Parties of German-speaking cantons Glarus and Graubünden. Originally the SVP was exclusively 
active in the German-speaking cantons of Switzerland, but it now has branches in all three other 
language areas too. It consequently developed into a Swiss nationalist party, although it is still 
strongest in the German-speaking part and historically associated with protestant middle-class. 
In the 2003 general elections the SVP gained 55 out of 200 seats in the lower house, thus 
becoming the largest party, and obtained two out the seven Bundesrat-positions. Especially 
the Zurich branch of the SVP, previously led by Christoph Blocher (until his inauguration as 
Minister of Justice also president of the radical AUNS – Aktion für eine unabhängige und 
neutrale Schweiz), has been labelled populist (Linder 1999).   
 The Front National was founded by Jean-Marie Le Pen in 1972, who started his political 
career with the anti-European and nationalist Poujadists in the 1950s. FNʼs hostility towards 
immigrants and Le Penʼs numerous allegedly racist statements have shocked many but not 
withheld the party of being elected into the European Parliament and into ofﬁce in some French 
towns. Front Nationalʼs greatest national success was acquired during the 2002 presidential 
elections when Le Pen made it to the second round, beating the socialist leader Jospin in the 
ﬁrst round. Although more often labelled extreme-right, FN has been portrayed as a populist 
movement by several scholars (Golder 2003; Scharsach 2002).   
 During the 2002 Dutch elections newcomer Lijst Pim Fortuyn won a landslide victory, 
obtaining 26 out of 150 available seats in parliament. LPFʼs turbulent rise and the behaviour 
of its ﬂamboyant leader – Pim Fortuyn, who was assassinated nine days before the elections 
9– caused several scholars to draw on the concept of populism in an attempt to classify this 
newcomer (see Van der Brug 2003; Keman and Pennings 2003).
 The Flemish regionalist party Vlaams Blok (Flemish Block) originates from the end 
of the 1970s when two Flemish parties – the Flemish National Party and the Flemish Peopleʼs 
Party – formed a coalition in reaction to, in VBʼs own words ʻthe too left course of the Peopleʼs 
Union and the humiliating communitarian agreement  ʼ(VB 2002: 8). Since the beginning of the 
1990s VB has been a successful political party with around 15% of the electorate supporting 
it, although it has been kept out of government by means of a ʻcordon sanitaire  ʼ of all the 
established parties. 
 The Freiheitliche Partei Österreich has been on the Austrian political scene since 
the 1970s, presenting itself as a liberal party. Since the late 1980s however, the rise of its 
most prominent political leader Jörg Haider and a seemingly consequent radicalisation of the 
partyʼs stances on immigration led many to label FPÖ radical right wing and populist (Betz and 
Immerfall 1998; Papadopulos 2000; Scharsach 2003). 
 Die Republikaner are not a signiﬁcant player on the German federal level, since long 
failing to clear the ﬁve percent threshold. Die Republikaner were formed in 1983 as a right-
wing split-off from the Bavarian Christian Social Union (CSU). Their initial electoral success 
brought them seats in many local councils, the state legislature of Badem-Württemberg, and, in 
1989, the European Parliament. In the latter they formed a ʻtechnical faction  ʼwith ʻparty family 
members  ʼFlemish Vlaams Blok and French Front National. In several studies Die Republikaner 
have been labelled (neo-)populist (Betz and Immerfall 1998; Scharsach 2003).
4.2 References to the ʻpeopleʼ
It is not hard to ﬁnd clear examples of references to the people in party manifestoes of the SVP. 
Statements like “Der Mittelstand wird ausgesaugt” and a plea for “Dem Volk das letzte Wort 
auch in der Aussenpolitik” are the most explicit examples of a total of 49 coded references to 
the people (or synonyms as Das Volk, Der Wähler, Burger, Bevölkerung or Publikum). Some 
references to the cleavage between the people and the state, between the establishment and 
the SVP were less indisputable. We did include statements for which this rhetoric opposition 
unequivocally followed from the context, but remained out any statements in which this 
cleavage left unmentioned. The references to the people have a civic connotation rather than a 
nationalistic one.   
 In the lengthy programme of the Front National we coded a total of 106 references to 
the people, 86 of which can be interpreted as speaking of the monolithic, sovereign entity pitted 
against its enemy, the establishment. Twenty statements can subsequently be characterised 
as referring to subgroups within the nation, examples being farmers and entrepreneurs. The 
references to the people the FN is making have an explicit nationalist connotation, the great 
majority constituted of the category ʻThe French  ʼ(ʻLes Françaisʼ), followed by ʻcompatriots  ʼ
(ʻLes compatriotesʼ). This observation is strengthened by the fact that many statements reﬂect 
10
FNʼs interpretation that the bulk of the problems the people suffer result from immigration and 
the process of European Integration.
 For the LPF, the number of references to the people (ʻde burgerʼ) in a positive sense 
vis-à-vis the government equals 46. (Representative quotes being ʻDe overheid is er voor 
de burger en niet andersomʼ or ʻDe zorg bij de burger brengenʼ). If we include associated 
references to the people such as the patient, the entrepreneur, and also phrases such as common 
sense (ʻgezond verstandʼ) and commonality, which were used in the same rhetorical way, 62 
statements classify as populist references to the people. The absolute number of references and 
the context in which the references are made leaves almost no room for doubt: the vocabulary 
of the LPF is one of appealing to the (common) people. 
 Die Republikaner refer thirteen times to the people or to clearly related concepts. 
If we broaden our category to include related but different notions (such as ʻOpferschutzʼ, 
ʻUnternehmerʼ, ʻgesundes Mittelstandʼ) we score 36 references. This does not seem very high, 
and if we look beyond the numbers – we note that we left out references which have a pure 
nationalist connotation such as ʻPatriotismus  ʼ and ʻHerrschaft des Volkes  ʼ – it is not at all 
obvious that these references are populist. The references present a mix between strong liberal 
(ʻStaatsburgerʼ, ʻBurgerrechteʼ) and nationalist (ʻPatriotenʼ) connotations.
 For the FPÖ we coded a total of 27 references, 13 of which refer to the people vis-à-
vis the establishment and 14 to different subgroups. The majority of the 13 general references 
carry the word citizen (ʻBürger  ʼ and ʻBürgernäheʼ, the latter can be translated as ʻclose to 
the citizensʼ). Two references refer to ʻthe people  ʼ (ʻDas Volkʼ), understood as the Austrian 
nation, which is constituted of different historic, German-speaking, ʻVolksgruppenʼ. Besides 
this nationalist notion of the people, many statements refer either to different occupational 
groups such as farmers (ʻBauernʼ), employees in so-called unprotected sectors (ʻErwerbstätige 
im nichtgeschützten Bereichʼ), artists (ʻKünstlerʼ), or to members of the working – i.e. tax-
paying – population. The latter are referred to in terms of ʻthe insured  ʼ (ʻVersicherteʼ), ʻthe 
contributing  ʼ(ʻBeitragszahlerʼ) and ʻeconomic effort-makers  ʼ(ʻLeistungsträgerʼ). 
 In ʻ Een toekomst voor Vlaanderenʼ, Vlaams Blokʼs party programme of December 2002 
we counted a total number of 102 references to the people, 78 of which refer to ʻ people-against-
establishment  ʼ and 24 to particular, mostly occupational, groups. With 18 references ʻwe  ʼ
(wij/we) is the term most often employed, followed by two categories that may be translated 
as ʻthe people  ʼ(12 + 12 times: ʻVolkʼ and ʻMensenʼ). The former should be understood in a 
regionalist (Flemish) context, the latter as ʻcommon  ʼor ʻordinary  ʼpeople. Important to note is 
that VB oftentimes equates itself with the people, when ʻwe  ʼin one sentence refers to the party 
cadre whereas in the next it relates to the Flemish people. We coded references to subgroups 
within the Flemish community too: shop-owners, handicapped and small entrepreneurs. The 
VB mentioned these groups of ʻcommon men  ʼas illustrations of the entire Flemish population 
that perceivably is the victim of an illegitimate and unrepresentative establishment, of crime, of 
unfair ﬁnancial ﬂows to the Walloons and of immigration. These subgroups are partes-pro-toto 
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for the ʻordinary people  ʼthat deserve to be freed from the yoke of Belgian federalism and a 
self-interested and corrupt establishment.  
4.3 People-leadership relations
As Switzerland utilises the instruments of direct democracies more than any other European 
country, a clear-cut plea for more direct forms of democracy cannot be expected from the 
SVP. We do notice, however, that the SVP identiﬁes itself strongly with popular initiatives 
for referenda: “Die SVP wird auch in Zukunft die Instrumente der direkten Demokratie nutzen 
müssen, wenn sie in den Parlamenten keine Mehrheit ﬁndet”. The SVP sees as the advantage of 
direct democracy that “Probleme dort gelöst werden, wo sie entstehen”. Instead of arguing for 
more direct forms of democracy, which are already in place in Switzerland, the SVP emphasises 
its approval of the frequent use of these instruments as it allows citizens to bring the popular 
will directly into the political arena.   
 With regard to strengthening the link between citizens and leaders Front National proposes 
some institutional changes such as extending the role of referenda and popular initiatives, but 
a more general democratic rhetoric is missing. The statements that reﬂect such ideas are few 
and lack a truly unmistakable democratic content, examples being ʻreturning to the French 
possession of their liberties  ʼ(ʻRendre les Français propriétaires de leurs libertésʼ), and ʻFN 
puts the interests of France and the French before it all  ʼ(p. 180: ʻ[…] Il met lʼintérêt du peuple 
français au premier rang des devoirs du politiqueʻ). FN also promises to reduce the inﬂuence of 
lobbies on decision-making and to ﬁght clièntelism in French politics (p. 75: ʻLa concentration 
du pouvoir entre les mains dʼun petit nombre dʼhommes, sans mandat ni contrôle du pays, les 
rend plus que perméables à lʼinﬂuence de lobbies de tous ordres, venus les “éclairer” sur les 
décisions à prendreʼ). One further needs to bear in mind that the Head of Government in France 
is already directly elected; FN does however not put forward a proposal for direct election of 
mayors.  
 With regard to our second dimension of the populist ideology, the LPF advocates concrete 
proposals for the direct election of ofﬁce-holders, in casu mayors and the prime-minister, is in 
favour of public consultations and referenda, speciﬁcally about EU-issues. These statements are 
embedded in a general democratically inspired call for transparency (ʻParlementair taalgebruik 
moet duidelijk en begrijpelijk zijn voor iedereenʼ), and a proposal to reserve speaking time in 
parliament for citizens. The programme has a clear democratic vocabulary, calling for citizens 
to have access to government again (ʻHet openbaar bestuur moet weer toegankelijk worden 
voor de burgerʼ). 
 Die Republikaner also call for a general strengthening of democracy (ʻStärkung der 
direkten Demokratieʼ), which materialises in a call for referenda (ʻVolkabstimmungenʼ) and 
elected ofﬁcials (Head of Government; mayors are already directly elected in Germany). They 
also advocate ʻChancengleichheit für noch nicht in den Parlamenten vertretene Parteienʼ and 
denounce big companies for lack of democratic legitimisation. There is a clear and concrete call 
12
for democratic reforms, but more abstract oratory in favour of democratic deepening could be 
witnessed as well.
 The FPÖ speaks of ʻ an ongoing commitment to develop and preserve democracy for the 
people  ʼ(ʻAufbauen und erhalten bürgernaher Demokratieʼ, FPÖ 1997a: 6). In a separate chapter 
devoted to reform of democracy, it is stated that ʼ Austriaʼs political system needs on the one hand 
more free competition between democratic forces within the framework of a multi-party system 
and the reduction of inﬂuence by parties and lobbies  ʼ(ʻAbbauen von Parteien und Verbänden 
durchdrungenes staatliches Systemʼ, FPÖ 1997a: 13). In its chapter on democratic reform, the 
FPÖ calls for complementation of parliamentarism by instruments of direct democracy. The 
FPÖ promises to introduce plebiscitary rights in all ﬁelds of provincial and federal legislation. 
The FPÖ proposes the following instruments of direct democracy: extended possibilities for 
referenda and public questionnaires; direct election of the members of the Federal Council, 
whose power should be restored in relation to extra-constitutional (illegitimate) institutions; 
direct election (ʻdirect ballots by the peopleʼ) of the highest organs of the state (president, 
ministers, governors, mayors and administrative heads) and premature removal of such organs 
through a referendum (FPÖ 1997b: 18-19). For the FPÖ, ʻdependence on an overbearing 
bureaucracy, on a chamber state or on a state apparatus dominated by parties should be reduced 
according to the principle of freedom  ʼ(FPÖ 1997b: 3). These statements can be interpreted as 
supporting the populist thought of un-intermediated links between the people and their leader. 
 We found that the VB both employs abstract democratic rhetoric and proposes the 
introduction of concrete instruments of direct democracy. With regard to the latter, VB argues 
for direct elections of the head of government and mayors as well as for the introduction 
of binding referenda. In more general terms VB calls for ʻrevaluation of parliament  ʼ (VB 
2002: 9: ʻhet parlement […] herwaarderenʼ), ʻmore democracy  ʼ (p.: 9: ʻmeer democratieʼ), 
and ʻmore involvement of the people in decision-making  ʼ(p. 8: ʻhet volk meer betrekken bij 
besluitvormingʼ). VBʻs statement and theme of its 1996 party congress ʻthe people decide  ʼ(p. 9 
– 11: ʻhet volk beslistʼ) should further convince voters of the VBʼs populist project of bringing 
back democracy to the people.    
4.4 Anti-establishment statements
Although the SVP constantly makes liberal claims of the type “Minimum an Staat und einem 
Maximum an Markt”, the explicit denunciation of (corrupted, perverted) bureaucratic institutions 
are not numerous and often not very explicit. One of the clearer examples: “Staatliche 
Investionsprogramme sind höchstens dazu geeignet, die Staatsquote zu erhöhen und befreundeten 
Firmen staatliche Auftrage zuzuschanzen”. Clearly falling into the anti-intermediaries dimension 
of populist ideology are typical claims such as “Unnötige Regulierungen” and “bürokratische 
Schikanierung”. On the anti-elite dimension more numerous and explicit statements were 
found. The clearest examples of anti-statements are “Parlamentarier geben für ihre Reisen pro 
Monat mehr Geld aus, als SchweizerFamilien zum Leben habe” and “Die Ausgabenfreudugkeit 
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von Bundesrat und Parlament”, „Einige weinige diktierten die Meinung, welche die Presse zu 
vertreten hat” and “Es ist Zeit fur eine Trendwende zuruck zu einer ordnungspolitisch sauberen, 
verantwortungsbewussten Politik, frei von Filz und ruinoser Vetternwirtschaft”. While most of 
the anti-elite statements are focused mainly on the ʻanderen Parteienʼ or “so genannten Mitte-
parteien Bundesrat und Parlament”, this critique broadens itself beyond the political actors, 
and includes negativism about big companies and the media. 
 The Front National shoots its arrows both at the elites and at national and European 
institutions. In the former category we coded 60 statements, the latter comprises of 55 references. 
FN especially criticises the illegitimacy of the ruling elites, using terms such as oligarchy, 
despotism, abuse and nepotism (p. 179: ʻLa scène politique actuelle est un théâtre dʼombres où 
ceux qui dirigent effectivement se situent dans les coulisses, […] La principale caractéristique 
de la culture ofﬁcielle est de faire travailler le cercle des “amis” en dehors duquel il nʼy a point 
de salut. ʻ). According to FN, the ʻbourgeois dynasties  ʼare at the heart of an opaque political 
system, political and economic elites are automatically reproduced through ENA (National 
school for administration), public and private positions are exchanged and electoral mandates 
are conveyed from father to son (p. 76: ʻJamais les “dynasties bourgeoises” nʼont été autant 
présentes. [Les] responsables politiques et économiques […] sʼéchangent postes publics et 
directions de grandes sociétés, épouses ou maîtresses de ministres socialistes, journalistes de 
télévision, mandats électoraux transmis de père en ﬁlsʼ). The critique of the elites not only 
focuses on political actors, as journalists, scientists and bureaucrats are displayed as part of the 
failed system too. FN also condemns the overkill of bureaucracy and institutions, which cannot 
even produce proper social and economic output: ʻ[…] près de la moitié de la richesse créée 
dans notre pays est reprise par les administrations étatiques, locales et socialesʼ (p. 116).   
 The number of times bureaucracy, intermediary structures, subsidies and the like were 
mentioned in a pejorative way in the party programme of the LPF equals 69 (examples being 
ʻDe bezem moet door de overheidsbureaucratie  ʼand ʻSnoeien in tegenstrijdige en overbodige 
regelgevingʼ). Anti-bureaucracy is not ipso facto anti-(political)-establishment, and if we count 
the number of pejorative statements about the elite, parties and the (political) establishment, 
they are very few although explicit (ʻVriendjespolitiek bij het benoemen van functionarissen 
als burgemeesters moet tot het verleden gaan behorenʼ and ʻDe politieke partij heeft nauwelijks 
nog voeling met de wortels in de maatschappijʼ). Content analysis shows that the LPF scores 
high on a sort of anti-bureaucracy and anti-intermediaries dimension but not an anti-elite one; 
its anti-establishment rhetoric is practically uniquely directed against an allegedly overbearing 
bureaucracy and law system.
 For Die Republikaner, our broad anti-category is dominated by anti-party and anti-elite 
statements, numbering respectively 13 and 10 (an example being: “Monopolisierung politischer 
Macht bei wenigen Parteien”). Die Republikaner see a conspiracy of the elites against society, 
expressed by statements such as ʻDenkverboteʼ, and a plea for ʻwissenschaftliche Objektivitätʼ 
in order to avoid ʻpolitischer Indoktrinationʼ.
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 We coded 31 anti-establishment statements in FPÖʼs programme, 16 of which are 
directed against an elite of political parties, politically dependent journalists and interest groups, 
NGOʼs, ʻprivileged groups  ʼand their perceived inﬂuence in the banking sector and the ʻstate-
systemʼ. Fifteen statements are directed against institutions, speciﬁcally against an over-sized 
bureaucracy and a non-transparent, citizen-unfriendly law system. 
 For the FPÖ, a ʻ fair market economy precludes privileged groups and monopolies, party-
political control of whole branches of industry, domination of ofﬁcials in the ﬁelds of social 
insurance, of public economy and of the politicised banking sector  ʼ(FPÖ 1997b: 21). The FPÖ 
criticises the system of granting subsidies to media as well as ownership concentration in that 
sector which have perceivably led to ʻreporting inﬂuenced by instructions [...] and a massive 
distortion of political competition  ʼ(FPÖ 1997b: 14). We suspect this criticism to be founded 
in FPÖʼs frustrations about the negative way in which the party has been portrayed in national 
(and international) media. The FPÖ argues against the perceived development of professional 
organisations into a ʻ para-governmentʼ, resulting from their strong position in social partnership. 
ʻThe state under the rule of law shows a tendency to produce a multiplicity of laws, to complicate 
citizens  ʼaccess to law and even to deny it  ʼ(ibid.). For the FPÖ both ʻunbridled capitalism and 
failed socialism  ʼ(FPÖ 1997b: 23) are the enemies of common men, as they respectively exploit 
man and nature and degrades its ʻworkers  ʼinto administrative units.    
 The VB overwhelmingly directs its anti-establishment statements against the elite, to 
a lesser extent against intermediaries. The federal system (p. 2: ʻde Belgische constructieʼ) 
is claimed illegitimate and so opaque that ʻeven specialists cannot ﬁnd their way through its 
labyrinths  ʼ(p. 2: ʻ een doolhof waarin zelfs specialisten hun weg niet vindenʼ). The multi-cultural 
society is deemed utopian and its perceived advocates (p. 17: ʻde progressieve multiculturele 
lobbyʼ and p. 15: ʻGuy Verhofstadt […] profeet van het multiculturele geloofʼ) accused of 
working against the ordinary man (p. 15: ʻDe multiculturele verrijking is […] uitgedraaid 
op een dagelijkse nachtmerrieʼ). The VB speaks literally of ʻbehind-the-scenes politics  ʼ (p. 
9: ʻachterkamertjes[politiek]ʼ), which is claimed to have replaced parliament as the primary 
and legitimate arena for decision-making. Further, governing parties are accused of denying 
recommendations made by parliamentary investigation committees. These are all, in the words 
of VB, ʻ undemocratic and dictatorial practices  ʼ(VB 2002: 9, 11). Stances of ʻ the ruling political 
class  ʼ(p.9: ʻ de heersende politieke klasseʼ) are alleged to often diverge from those of the people, 
especially with regard to drugs issues, immigration, crime and ethical issues. This leads the VB 
to claim that ʻparliamentary democracy runs short with respect to democratic legitimacy  ʼ(VB 
2002: p. 9). The crooks in this corrupt system are the Walloons, the government parties (especially 
the Flemish liberals – which are said to have forgotten their earlier pro-Flanders stance – and 
the Walloon PS blocking pro-Flanders policies), the media (speciﬁcally the Flemish public 
broadcasting association VRT, which is claimed to have started ʻa dirty and holy war against 
VBʼ, see p. 11 ʻmedia and democracyʼ), the French speaking community, ʻFlemish  ʼpolitical 
parties, ʻtraditional parties and the mediaʼ, politics (p. 15: ʻde politiekʼ), ʻdemocratic  ʼpolitical 
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parties (p. 9: ʻzelfverklaarde democratenʼ), and established political parties (p. 4, 9, 27: ʻde 
traditionele partijenʼ). When speaking of crimes (perceivably) committed by immigrants, the 
establishment as an integrative cluster of the government, journalists and scientists, is explicitly 
placed opposite to ʻthe people  ʼ(p. 28: ʻde mensen op het terrain, magistraten en agentenʼ) and 
the VB. ʻWhereas the establishment wrongly focused on low-quality scientiﬁc reports related 
to the subject, the people and VB knew better all the time  ʼ (VB 2002: p. 28).  And, ʻwhat 
government calls petty crimes often leads to huge traumas for the people involved  ʼ(p. 26: ʻwat 
voor de overheid “kleine criminaliteit”is, leidt voor de betrokkene vaan tot grote trauma sʼʼ). 
VBʼs anti-establishment statements are thus directed against a wide range of both elites and 
institutions and practices. The VB sketches the establishment in a broad sense, including political 
parties and individual politicians, the media and scientists. Trade unions, insurance companies 
and even the church are accused of illegitimately inﬂuencing decision-making processes, thus 
of disturbing the democratic process. 
4.5 Are the usual suspects ʻguilty  ʼof populism? 
In table 1 we present an overview of the empirical results of our analysis of the SVP, FN, LPF, 
Die Republikaner, FPÖ and VB. A ﬁrst and important conclusion that can be drawn on the 
basis of our analysis of the party manifestoes is that all six parties score on each of the three 
indicators of populism and can therefore be rightfully labelled as populist parties. Nevertheless, 
we found substantial differences among the six parties with regard to the intensity and direction 
of the statements in their manifestoes. This invites us to go into more detail hereunder as well 
as to develop a preliminary typology of types of populist parties in the next section.
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 Table 1: Level of populism for six European political parties
No. of references 
to ʻthe peopleʼ
Direct Democracy No. of anti-
intermediary 
statements
No. of 
anti-elite 
statements
Total no. 
of populist 
statements
Narrow Broad Referendum Initiative Mayor H-o-G
SVP* 49
51  
(4.54)
Y Y Y - 21  (1.87) 56  (4.99) 128 (11.41)
FN 86
106  
(2.40)
Y Y - n.a. 55  (1.54) 60 (1.68) 221 (6.18)
LPF 46
62  
(6.76)
Y - Y Y 69  (7.52) 3  (0.33) 134 (14.61) 
Republikaner 12
35  
(8.77)
Y - n.a. Y 10  (2.51) 13  (3.26) 58 (14.54)
FPÖ 13
27  
(2.07)
Y - Y Y 15  (1.15) 16 (1.23) 58 (4.44)
VB 78
100  
(6.63)
Y
-
Y
Y 11  (0.73)
54  (3.58)
165 (10.93)
Narrow: references to the people in a general sense vis-à-vis government.
Broad: references in the narrow category and references to subgroups, as partes-pro-toto for the entire people.   
Referendum: Proposing binding or consulting referendum.
Initiative: Proposing citizens  ʼinitiative.
Mayor: Proposing directly elected mayors.
H-o-G: Proposing directly elected Head of Government.
n.a. = not applicable, already present in institutional framework
* The Swiss democratic system contains a considerable amount of instruments of direct democracy , among them binding 
referenda (a   difference exists between obligatory and facultative referenda, depending on the policy issues raised) and directly 
elected mayors. 
Between brackets: the relative size of the quantitative indicators, i.e. the number of references divided by the number of 
sentences of that partyʼs programme x 100. Hence, the values between brackets indicate the percentage of sentences containing 
(that particular type) of populist statements. In bold are the highest relative scores in each category. 
       
The SVP shows a relatively high level of populism, particularly with regard to anti-elite 
statements. This is surprising when one takes into account that the party leadership has been 
an integral part of the government-cartel at the national level. Equally paradoxical is the fact 
that the SVP frequently calls for more direct democracy, while Switzerland champions in the 
use of peopleʼs initiatives and popular referenda. The SVP particularly call for the use of these 
instrument when, in their eyes, parliament fails to act in accordance with the will of the people. 
Initiatives and referenda are seen as tools to circumvent or correct parliamentary decisions of 
the other parties to which the SVP refers as ʻcentristʼ. 
 While in absolute terms the Front National scores high on populism (with 106 references 
to the people and 115 anti-establishment statements), the proportion of populist sentences in 
only 6 per cent of the party programme. The FN condemns the unrepresentativeness of the 
political elites, the illegitimacy of existing political institutions and the overall lack of democratic 
control by the people. The anti-establishment statements against political intermediaries and 
the incumbent elite are not conﬁned to political actors alone. Journalists, researchers (political 
scientists in particular!) and bureaucrats are also pitted against the people. With regard to direct 
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democracy, the FN proposes a consultative referendum and the introduction of popular initiative 
on local and national issues. Overall, the FN scores relatively low in term of populism. 
 In the overall ranking of populism, the LPF comes out on top with almost 15 per 
cent of their party programme being populist statements. Particularly when the proportion of 
references to the people and anti-establishment statements are taken into account, the Lijst 
Pim Fortuyn clearly scores higher than all the other parties in this study. Only the proportion 
of anti-elite statements is relatively low. In their platform, the LPF frequently calls for cutting 
back bureaucracy, deregulation, the lowering of government subsidies and for diminishing the 
inﬂuence of NGOʼs. From this we conclude that the character of the LPFʼs populism is highly 
anti-institutional, instead of being anti-elitist as is the case with the SVP. The LPF proposes 
institutional changes for direct democracy, which are combined with a large amount of more 
general democratic statements in the spirit of ʻbringing back democracy to the peopleʼ. 
 Overall, the Republikaner score very high on populism, being second in the overall 
ranking on the proportion of populist statements in their party platform. The Republikaner 
score particularly high on references to the people, far more than any of the other parties. 
Also the proportion of anti-elite and anti-intermediary statements is relatively high in their 
elections programme. Less emphasis is put on proposals for a direct people-leader link as the 
Republikaner only present a limited number of proposals for instruments of direct democracy.  
 The results for the Freiheitliche Partei Österreich shows relatively low levels of populism. 
Their overall score is lowest of all six parties. Only around four per cent of their party platform 
contains statements with a populist character. In general the FPÖ wants to bring ʻdemocracy 
closer to the people  ʼ(ʻBürgernahe Demokratieʼ), but institutional proposals are not numerous. 
 The Vlaams Blok scores relatively high on references to the people and the party 
frequently expresses a radical anti-elite attitude. The VB perceives the corrupted elites not only 
in control of the political sphere, but also controlling the media and academia (particularly 
political scientists!). All of them are perceivably acting in their own self-interest, and even 
more: against the interest of the people and the ʻnationʼ. Compared to the other parties, the 
VB scores high on anti-elite statements, whereas its critique of intermediary institutions and 
bureaucracy is comparatively modest. The VB does not attack the political system in general 
– although the Belgian federal ʻconstruction  ʼis criticised severely – but more the corrupt elites, 
both in politics and other sectors. With this radical anti-elite character the Vlaams Blok presents 
itself as the underdog that is kept out of government through a ʻcordon sanitaire  ʼby the other 
parties. The VB advocates more direct democracy, through several proposals to create a more 
direct link between the people and its leaders. 
 While all the parties included in this research score on all three dimensions and can 
thus be labelled populist, we found substantial differences with respect to the general level 
of populism as well as the speciﬁc elements of the populist ideology that the various parties 
emphasise. We understand populism as a democratic ideology calling for the sovereignty of the 
people and a restoration of the supremacy of their will. Clearly the LPF, Republikaner the SVP 
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and the VB meet that deﬁnition. The Front National and particularly the FPO display lower 
levels of populism than is often suggested by political observers. In order to make sense of the 
variation in emphasis on speciﬁc elements of the populist ideology, we develop a typology of 
populism in the section below.
4.6 Types of populism
Close examination of our ﬁndings leads us to make a preliminary typology of populist parties. 
Our typology is based on the speciﬁc character of rhetoric that political parties display in their 
election programmes and the speciﬁc dimensions of populism they emphasise. Our typologies 
should be read as preliminary categories, to be reinforced and potentially diversiﬁed through 
further research. 
 With regard to the dimension of references to ʻthe people  ʼ we found that parties 
either hold a regionalist/nationalist notion of the people they represent (FN, FPÖ, VB and 
Republikaner), or leave such an explicit view unmentioned (SVP, LPF). Parties in the former 
category overwhelmingly deﬁne ʻthe people  ʼin a nationalist (or, in the case of VB, regionalist) 
sense, pitting them explicitly against the national elites, immigrants and European organisations. 
The SVP and LPF however tend to speak of the people in a more neutral way, using the notion 
ʻcitizens  ʼoftentimes. This distinction regarding the character of references to the people calls 
for an (initial) typology of ethnic nationalist versus civic populism.  
 Secondly, parties either tend to speak of the people in a general ʻvis-à-vis government  ʼ
way most of the times (FN, LPF and VB), or refer more often to partes-pro-toto for the people 
in general such as particular occupational groups, the working population, and tax-payers (SVP, 
FPÖ and Die Republikaner). The emphasis on this type of references by the latter three parties 
might be explained by their historical roots within liberal-conservative or agrarian movements. 
We propose a division between collectivist versus particularistic populism here. 
 As for our second dimension – proposals to create a direct relationship between the 
people and the government – we found some signiﬁcant differences too. All parties score on 
the sub-category of ʻconcrete  ʼproposals for the introduction of instrument of direct democracy. 
Not all however complement these proposals with abstract promises to ʻchange politics  ʼ or 
alter the ʻpresent cultureʼ. The LPF, Die Republikaner and the VB score high on both types of 
proposals, whereas the FPÖ party programme shows a particularly high number of concrete 
initiatives. In a general sense, the FN election manifesto lacks an explicit pro-democratic nature, 
only materialising in some institutional proposals. Here, the preliminary typology consists of 
ʼpragmatic  ʼpopulists (SVP, FN and FPÖ) versus ʻabstract romanticist  ʼpopulism (none of the 
parties in this study) and a category combining both (Republikaner, LPF and VB). 
 We divided our third category, anti-establishment statements, into anti-elite and anti-
intermediaries statements. This division provides for the last typology we suggest on the basis 
of our ﬁndings. We distinguish between ʻanti-elite  ʼ populism (VB and SVP) within parties 
that in their critique of the establishment emphasise the perceived undemocratic behaviour of 
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a political class,  and ʻanti-intermediaries  ʼpopulism (LPF), which is particularly directed at 
intermediary organisations and the institutional framework that stand between the people and 
their leader. We further recognise a category of populists that divide their critique relatively 
equally between elites and institutions(FN, FPÖ and Die Republikaner). An overview of this 
preliminary categorisation into varieties of populism is presented in table 2.
Table 2: A preliminary typology of populisms
References to ʻthe Peopleʼ Direct Democracy Anti-establishment
Ethnic
Nationalist
Civic Collectivist Particularistic Pragmatic Abstract Elite Intermediaries
SVP - X - X X - X -
FN X - X - X - X X
LPF - X X - X X - X
Republikaner X - - X X X X X
FPÖ X - - X X - X X
VB X - X - X X X -
X = party scores on this element
- = party does not score on this element
5 Conclusion
It was our observation that there is a stark contrast between the advanced theoretical debate 
about populism and the unfounded manner in which parties are labelled populist, without much 
sensitivity for differences between parties. In this paper we therefore set off to develop an 
understanding of populism, based on an analysis of the theoretical debate on populism, as well 
as to construct an analytical tool to assess whether political parties can be called populist. It 
was our aim to detach the term from those parties with which it is so often equated, formulate 
a deﬁnition of populism, and operationalise it in order to put the ʻusually suspected  ʼparties to 
the test.
 We view populism an ideology of democracy, calling for the supremacy of the will 
of the people and against the intermediary structures and elites that pervert the direct link 
between the people and the leader(ship). We hold that the populist ideology contains – in line 
with Heywoodʼs (2003) deﬁnition of an ideology – three aspects: (1) criticism of the current 
situation, (2) a sketch of an ideal situation and (3) proposals to arrive from the current to the 
ideal situation. Understood as such, we deemed three aspects to be at the heart of populism: 
critique of the elites that act out of self-interest and the intermediary institutions that make them 
live and survive, an understanding of ʻthe people  ʼas a the sovereign and monolithic entity that 
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needs protection against this establishment, and a direct connection between the people and the 
government as the populist solution that should restore the sovereignty of the people.  
 We operationalised these three aspects for our analysis of party programmes. We 
labelled political parties populist on the basis of three elements: (1) the number of references 
to ʻthe peopleʼ; (2) proposals for a direct link between the people and government; and (3) 
anti-establishment statements. Subsequently, we analysed party programmes of six European 
parties: Schweizerische Volkspartei (Switzerland), Front National (France), Lijst Pim Fortuyn 
(Netherlands), Vlaams Blok (Belgium, Flanders), Die Republikaner (Germany) and the 
Freiheitliche Partei Österreich (Austria). Our case selection was based on the fact that these 
parties are often labelled populist by political observers. 
 Our conclusions were twofold. In the ﬁrst place, we found that the six political parties 
score on each of the three dimensions, justifying their classiﬁcation as populists. Secondly, we 
found that these parties scored differently on the three dimensions, both in terms of intensity 
and with regard to the character of their statements. We thus proposed that these parties should 
not be lumped together under one single heading without further differentiation. As for the 
extent of populism we found that the LPF, Die Republikaner, SVP and VB score high on our 
scale of populism, whereas the FN and particularly the FPÖ lag behind in their relative level 
of populism. Variation among the six parties could further be witnessed with regard to the 
manner in which they deﬁned ʻthe peopleʼ, the character of their anti-establishment statements 
and their proposals for direct democracy. Whereas the Front National, Die Republikaner, the 
FPÖ and Vlaams Blok formulate the ʻpeople  ʼin nationalist or regionalist terms, the SVP and 
LPF lack such an exclusivist vision of the people. Based on that distinction we tentatively 
concluded that the four former parties display an ethnic type of populism, whereas SVPʼs and 
LPFʼs populism can be described as civic. Further typologies that were made are: ʻcollectivist  ʼ
(FN, LPF and VB) versus ʻparticularistic  ʼ (FPÖ, SVP and FN) populism, ʻpragmatic  ʼ (all 
parties) versus ʻabstract romanticist  ʼ(none in this study) populism (and in a mixed category: 
LPF, Die Republikaner and VB), and anti-elite (SVP and VB) versus anti-intermediaries (LPF) 
populism (in between category: FN, FPÖ and Republikaner). In sum, the concept of populism 
can be measured empirically, but only if one uses an operationalisation that is sensitive to the 
substantial differences among political parties that all belong to the populist party family. 
21
Note
1 It should be noted here that we analysed the 1997 FPÖ programme of principles, rather than its most recent 
election programme. Since the document is so pertinently present on the FPÖ website we assumed that this 
document is directed at potential voters and therefore comparable to the election manifestoes of other political 
parties we analysed. It is thereby our aim in further research to include this type of documents, as well as speeches 
and other sources.   
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